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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
As a result of industrial expansion, South Africa has experienced enormous economic growth 
over the past several years.1 However, industrial progress has had a negative effect on the 
environment through the activities of both individuals and the corporate world.2 Although a 
vast array of environmental laws have been implemented in a bid to alleviate the impact of 
industrial progress on the environment, the negative trend has not been stopped. For this 
reason cooperation between the government and the private sector in enforcing the law is of 
high importance. The private sector has pooled together its resources in the form of public 
interest environmental litigation (PIEL), but as it stands, it may be very difficult to get an 
interdict remedy to back environmental protection efforts.  
Development of environmental rights jurisprudence in South Africa relies upon legal entities 
changing the manner in which they approach the environmental right.3 The Constitution has 
taken the first step in granting parties litigating in the public interest locus standi as opposed 
to the previous position that denied them such access to the courts.4 Nevertheless, remedies 
that were framed in the pre-constitutional milieu are still being applied with little adaptation 
to the Constitution‟s involvement.5 A perusal of the remedies provided under statute and 
common law, shows that only reactive remedies were being awarded to public interest 
litigants, as opposed to the proactive remedies necessary for the adequate protection of the 
environment.6 
1.2 Background of the study 
Compliance with and enforcement of environmental law in South Africa has evolved since 
the promulgation of the Constitution.7 Included within the Constitution is the environmental 
                                                          
1 Statistics South Africa Statistical Release P0441 (2013) 2.  
2 F Oosthuizen „The Polluter Pays Principle: Just a Buzz word of Environmental Policy?‟ (1998) 5 SAJELP 1.  
3 Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Sasol Mining v Save the Vaal Environment and Others 
1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA) - hereafter Save the Vaal. 
4 Patz v Greene & Co 1907 TS 427- hereafter Patz; Roodepoort- Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 1933 AD 31- hereafter Roodepoort. 
5 C Loots „Locus Standi to Claim Relief in the Public Interest Matters Involving the Enforcement of Legislation‟ 
(1987) 104 SALJ 16, B van Niekerk 'The Ecological Norm in Law or the Jurisprudence of the Fight Against 
Pollution' (1975) 92 SALJ 78 and T Murombo 'Locus Standi to claim relief in the Public Interest in matters 
involving the Enforcement of Legislation' (1987) SALJ 131. 
6 M Kidd Environmental Law 2ed (2011) 271. 




right8 and the expanded locus standi provisions granting more people access to the courts.9 
Earlier environmental protection was difficult to enforce in the absence of an environmental 
legal norm and access to the courts;10 making these two interlinked developments very 
welcome.   
However, innovations which can lead to environmental protection cannot be effective without 
adequate redress being granted by the courts when they are approached. The courts have 
constantly applied remedies that were moulded to address private litigation grievances to 
public interest litigation matters, with little of the requirements being adapted to meet the 
different litigants‟ needs. One such remedy that has been applied in this manner is the 
common law interdict. This interdict is an important and effective remedy to supplement the 
efforts of public interest litigants. However, the courts still approach the interdict with a 19th 
century mind-set incorporating individual autonomy, rather than a 20th century approach that 
incorporates a community-based mind-set.11 
The 20th century approach of placing the community‟s interests at heart is evident from the 
plethora of environmental laws all seeking to ensure that irreparable harm to the environment 
is kept at its lowest level.12 The focus on ensuring behavioural changes along the lines of 
environmental compliance has however fallen short of acknowledging that man is a rational 
being seeking to maximise self-interest.13 The violators of environmental laws are „strongly 
influenced by the likelihood of detection, coupled with the real risk of severe punishment.‟14 
The remedies that seek to address environmental problems often do not do much justice to 
the environment or public interest due to their being reactive in nature.15 The courts have the 
role of filling the gap that exists in the enforcement of the environmental statutes, so that the 
meaning of environmental right, enshrined in the Constitution is implemented. This 
dissertation seeks to investigate how the common law interdict remedy may be utilised by 
public interest litigants, to enhance environmental compliance in South Africa. 
                                                          
8 Ibid Section 24. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Van Niekerk (note 5 above). 
11 A Chayes „The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation‟ (1979) 89 Harvard LR 1285. 
12 F Craigie, P Snigman and M Fourie „Dissecting Environmental Compliance and Enforcement‟ in A Paterson 
and L Kotze (ed) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) 43.  
13 TF Malloy „Regulation, Compliance and the Firm‟ (2003) 76 Temple Law Review 451. 
14 F Craigie, P Snigman and M Fourie (note 12 above). 
15 G Becker „Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach‟ (1968) 76 (2) Journal of Political Economy 117 
and JD Silberman „Does Environmental Deterrence Work? Evidence and Experience Say Yes, But we need to 




1.3 Objective of the study 
This dissertation will firstly explore the nature and importance of PIEL in the South African 
jurisprudence. Secondly, the nature and type of interdicts that can be applied through PIEL 
will be explored in order to assess how this remedy may fulfil the public interest litigants‟ 
goals. Lastly, it will be assessed whether or not there is a need for a new solution in South 
Africa to give effect to the environmental right.  
1.4 Research Question(s) 
The main research question to be addressed in this discussion is the approach courts should 
adopt when an interdict is applied in the public interest, or in the interest of protecting the 
environment. Interpretation of the interdict requirements by the courts, in relation to private 
individuals is clear and definitive, but some dissonance still exists when the same remedy is 
sought in the public interest.16 In order to respond to this broad question, the discussion will 
also look into the nature and importance of PIEL in South Africa.  
 
The study will also look into the types of interdicts public interest litigants may seek a court 
of law to award. Thereafter, the requirements that have to be met when seeking an interdict 
will be discussed to show the challenges PIEL is likely to face. This question leads to an 
analysis of the way in which the challenges that public interest litigants are likely to face in 
meeting the interdict requirements, should be addressed when presented before the courts of 
law.  
1.5 Assumptions underlying the study 
This study is written based on the realisation that the enforcement of environmental laws 
cannot be solely left for the state to undertake. Where possible, participation of the nation‟s 
citizens is needed so as to provide a robust environmental enforcement mechanism. The 
Constitution and the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA)17 have put in place 
the legal and institutional framework necessary to accommodate public interest litigants who 
are willing to enforce environmental laws such as standing. However, currently the remedies 
awarded by courts to public interest litigants have been mainly reactive.18 Protection of the 
                                                          
16 R Summers „Common Law Remedies for Environmental Protection‟ in A Paterson and L Kotze (ed) 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa : Legal Perspectives (2009) 350. 
17 Act 107 of 1998 -  hereafter NEMA. 
18 MA Rabie „Legal Remedies for Environmental Protection‟ (1972) 5 (3) The Comparative and International 




environment requires proactive remedies, as opposed to reactive remedies in a bid to prevent 
irreparable harm to the environment.19 Public interest litigants may look to the common law 
interdict as one of the proactive remedies that can effectively protect the environment. It is 
submitted that this remedy has the effect of protecting the environment before harm has 
occurred. It is thus of crucial importance that the interdict remedy be granted by the courts to 
both the state and citizens willing to undertake the task of protecting the environment as the 
Constitution envisaged.  
1.6 Research Methodology 
This discussion is based upon primary research and is not a quantitative research study. This 
research method has been utilised because it is the best means of achieving the researchers‟ 
aim of critically analysing the interdict remedy. The study will rely on the Constitution, 
legislation, case law, books and published journal articles and theses relating to the objective 
and research questions set out above.  
1.7 Overview of chapters 
This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. The second chapter 
discusses the definition of PIEL, the role PIEL plays in South Africa, and where the mandate 
of PIEL in South Africa is founded. Chapter three will be devoted to analysing the nature of 
the different types of interdicts, and the requirements that need to be satisfied in order for an 
interdict to be granted. These requirements will be discussed with the objective of showing 
the challenges that public interest litigants may face within the current framework in seeking 
an interdict relief. There will also be a fourth chapter dedicated to examining the manner in 
which courts may assimilate a public interest litigant‟s application for an interdict, within the 
current framework of the interdict requirements. As an alternative, the discussion will look 
into the issue of whether a new remedy, as per the constitutional principles, needs to be 
developed. Chapter five concludes the whole discussion, and provides recommendations that 
public interest litigants may bring before the courts in the next instance when they seek an 
interdict aimed at protecting the environment.  
 
                                                          




CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Since the case of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v Federal Power Commission,20 
PIEL cases have been on the increase globally. This case set out the environmental litigation 
precedent on how courts may be utilised to help prevent, mitigate, remediate and seek 
compensation for harm done to the environment. Environmental protection can be effectively 
achieved through various means, one of these being the efforts of public interest litigants and 
the PIEL process. However, public interest litigants have faced numerous problems in trying 
to ensure that private individuals and government bodies comply with the nation‟s various 
environmental laws. South Africa has since made great strides in addressing some of the 
challenges that public interest litigants faced during the pre-constitutional era, but these 
resolutions have not been sufficiently effective in helping public interest litigants.21  
This chapter will lay a foundation as to the meaning and importance of PIEL. Furthermore, 
an analysis into the development of PIEL under the common law, and its application in South 
Africa‟s constitutional dispensation will be explored.  
2.2 Public Interest Environmental Litigation  
The concept of PIEL is a fairly new concept in South Africa‟s jurisprudence. Globally, 
litigation which seeks to vindicate public rights is known as public interest litigation (PIL) or 
citizen suits.22 PIEL however should be seen as a subset of PIL that is focused on promoting 
respect for the environment. In order to understand the concept of PIEL one first has to 
understand PIL; a term which unfortunately has no universally acceptable definition.23 
                                                          
20 407 US 9256, 92 S Ct 2453 (1972). This is often regarded as the founding case in environmental litigation in 
which the court held that the applicants had a „special interest in aesthetic, conservational, and recreational 
aspects‟ of activities the power plant in the mountain would cause. 
21 BJ Preston „Towards an Effective Guarantee of the Green Access: Japan‟s Achievements and Critical Points 
from a Global Perspective‟ (2013) available at http://www.lec.justice.nsw.gov.au accessed on 18 November 
2014. The author identifies the twelve conditions which are essential for effective public interest environmental 
litigation. The conditions include the lack of adequate environmental laws, justifiability, willing and able 
plaintiffs, knowledgeable, experienced and willing lawyers, funding of litigation, standing to sue, evidence to 
prove a case, independent, impartial and competent court, delay in hearing and determining cases, interlocutory 
practice and procedure and adequate remedies which is the focus of this study.  
22 H Hershkoff „Public Interest Litigation: Selected Issues and Examples (2005) available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/  accessed on 23 September 2014. 




Various authors who have sought to define the concept have, in most instances emphasised 
one component of PIL, which the author of this dissertation identifies as PIL‟s main focus.24  
A general definition of PIL is given by Homburger.25 This author defines PIL as a court 
action that is instigated by plaintiffs who are driven to claim relief that benefits the public at 
large, or a particular segment of the populace, rather than primarily benefitting the plaintiff‟s 
own interests.26 This definition is similar to the one that is recommended by the South 
African Law Commission (SALC).27 The SALC defines PIL as an „action instituted by a 
representative in the interest of the public generally, or in the interest of a section of the 
public, but not necessarily in that representative‟s own interest.‟28 The definitions given by 
Homburger and SALC, although broadly describing the PIL process, do not adequately 
reflect the core purpose of litigation which is in the public‟s interest. The core purpose of PIL 
should be seen through the eyes of one seeking to advance broader social objectives such as 
legal reform and human rights vindication. The vindication of legal rights and interests of 
individuals or groups through the litigation process is merely incidental to the attainment of 
the broader vision.29  
PIEL can be defined along similar lines as PIL. Barker defines PIEL as litigation that has the 
particular objective of obtaining a legal remedy from the courts, or a decision, ruling from an 
administrative body, which will have the effect of protecting, conserving or advancing the 
conservation and protection of the environment.30 It is submitted however that this definition 
does not specify the party seeking the remedy, since this remedy is sought by members of the 
community as opposed to private litigants. 31 Also, the goal and the purpose of PIEL, as in the 
definition advanced by Barker, may be achieved by private litigants who would have 
approached the courts seeking to rectify a private legal wrong, which may in the end benefit 
the community at large.32 Lastly, this definition does not take into account the fact that 
                                                          
24 R Putman Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993) 163. 
25 A Homburger „Private Suits in the Public Interest in the United States of America‟ (1974) 23 Yale LJ 16. 
26 Ibid 387; C Loots (note 5 above) 132. 
27 SA Law Commission Project 88 The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South 
African Law (August 1998) 6. 
28 Ibid 24.  This is also the working definition adopted in the Public Interest and Class Actions Bill. 
29 YM Badwaza Public Interest Litigation as practised by South African Human Rights NGOs: Any Lessons for 
Ethiopia, (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Western Cape, 2005) 7. 
30 M Barker, „Standing to Sue in Public Interest Environmental Litigation: From ACF v Commonwealth to 
Tasmanian Conservation Trust v Minister for Resources‟ (1996) 13 EPLJ 186. 
31 C McGrath „Flying Foxes, Dams and Whales: Using Federal Environmental Laws in the Public Interest‟ 
(2008) 25 EPLJ 327. 
32 M Galanter „The Radiation Effects of the Courts‟ in Boyum KO and L Mather (eds) Empirical Theories about 




private litigants, such as giant corporations that have the primary goal of enhancing private 
gain, may conceal their cause within an environmental conservation basis as was the case in 
Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental 
Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga 
Province and Others.33  The definition that will be adopted in this discussion of PIEL relates 
to situations where a community group with the dominant purpose, not of protecting or 
vindicating private rights or interests, but protecting the environment, makes legal 
proceedings to a court or tribunal.34 The end result of such a PIEL case should be aimed at 
setting a precedent that has sufficient impact to help the disadvantaged community which is 
not able to enforce their rights in a court of law.35 The definition advanced above takes note 
of the important role that PIEL undertakes in enforcing the environmental right for the benefit 
of the broader population, who may not have the necessary resources to enforce their 
constitutionally enshrined right.  
In addition to the remedy that a court of law may award to public interest litigants, such a 
verdict is taken up by other services that complement the litigation process in actually 
precipitating change on the ground. PIEL works closely with other professions in ensuring 
that the precedent granted by the court of law reaches the society that is meant to benefit from 
such a verdict. Legal education, research, lobbying, and advocacy are all important 
ingredients to a successful and effective implementation of the remedy that is awarded during 
PIEL proceedings.36 Both the state and private individuals are bound by such court decisions 
and effectively the environment is protected.37  
2.3 The importance of public interest environmental litigation 
In a young democracy that is in the process of developing its environmental jurisprudence, 
PIEL plays a pivotal role in developing the environmental culture of that country. It is 
important for the message of environmental social reform to become part of people‟s way of 
thinking; PIEL is one of the best means of driving this message home.38 A single case that is 
brought before the courts radiates beyond the mere judicial boundaries and enters into the 
                                                          
33 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) – hereafter Fuel Retailers. 
34 McGrath (note 31 above) 327. 
35 F Kathree „Public Interest Law: Its Continuing role in South Africa‟ (2002) Johannesburg Bar Advocate 
Forum 33. 
36 YM Badwaza (note 29 above) 8. 
37 Section 8(1) of the 1996 Constitution.  
38 H Hershkoff and A McCutcheon „Public Interest Litigation: An International Perspective‟ in M McClaymont 




public realm.39 At the same time, after such precedent has been granted, PIEL has the ability 
to enlighten and develop a culture of accountability with regards to socially acceptable 
environmental norms and hence promoting good governance. Lobel notes that the success of 
PIEL is not seen in the manner of the relief that is granted, but by the contribution such a 
relief would make to the society‟s livelihood.40 The contribution that PIEL makes is essential 
in raising the low environmental right awareness among the South African population.  
Environmental enforcement in South Africa as in many other jurisdictions cannot be left 
solely for the state to undertake. Although the state has been given the primary responsibility 
of ensuring environmental law compliance, it needs to integrate the efforts that the public 
sector brings in this area.41 Loots notes that concerned citizens ought to assist the government 
in the enforcement of environmental laws since the government often lacks the resources to 
do this.42 This is imperative given that the Constitution now grants everyone the right to a 
clean and healthy environment, a goal to which public interest litigants may help to achieve.43 
The National Water Act (NWA) for example grants the Minister, as the public trustee of the 
nation‟s water resources, the power to apply for an interdict, but such power has rarely been 
utilised.44 The sporadic use of this power, notwithstanding the number of people violating 
their water licence conditions or operating without a licence, shows that the government 
needs the public‟s help in ensuring environmental compliance. The efforts that PIEL brings in 
filling this existing gap are crucial for „the development of a coherent and robust South 
African environmental jurisprudence.‟45  
PIEL in South Africa is of further vital importance due to the adoption of the principle of 
sustainable development, which has been the overarching theme in the development of most 
modern legal systems.46 The decisions that are sometimes taken by government departments 
                                                          
39 Galanter (note 32 above) 122. 
40 J Lobel „Courts as Forums for Protest‟ (2004) UCLA Law Review 548. 
41 N de Sadeleer, G Roller and M Dross Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and The Role of NGOs: 
Empirical Findings and Legal Appraisal (2005) 177. 
42 Loots (note 5 above) 31 
43 Ibid 30. M Kidd „Greening The Judiciary‟ (2006) 3 PER. 72. 
44 Section 155 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
45 Kidd (note 43 above) 84. 
46 The 1987 UN Commission on Environment and Development (The Bruntdland Report) defined Sustainable 
development as: 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the 
future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept 
of „needs‟, in particular the essential needs of the world‟s poor, to which overriding priority 
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have emphasised only one of the factors of sustainable development; an anomaly which PIEL 
can be credited as having been in the forefront of correcting.47 Good government decision-
making, principles and public debate is encouraged by the efforts that PIEL undertakes in 
promoting sustainable development.48 
2.4 Public interest environmental litigation under common law 
PIEL cases that were brought before the South African courts under common law were 
limited mainly to private nuisance related matters.49 The main reason for so few cases being 
litigated in the public interest was because of the challenges presented in meeting the locus 
standi requirements.50 The common law did not incorporate the 16th century Roman law 
principles that allowed the public to litigate to protect resources that were regarded as res 
sacre or res publicae.51 A restrictive approach was applied under the common law whereby 
the actio popularis action that applied under Roman law ceased to exist.52 In approaching a 
court of law, a litigant could only have his case decided after having satisfied the procedural 
aspects decided in limine. Two requirements had to be satisfied initially before the court 
would recognise the litigant as having standing. The first requirement that litigants need to 
satisfy for the court was whether the applicant had the necessary capacity to sue; a 
requirement most litigants found relatively easy to satisfy.53 The second requirement was 
however relatively difficult to satisfy, as it related to showing the existence of a „legally 
enforceable right‟ or „sufficient interest‟.54  
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The interpretation of the second locus standi requirement was the main impediment that 
hampered public interest litigant‟s efforts under the common law.55 The legally enforceable 
right that a litigant needed to establish was an interest that was direct and substantial to the 
litigant in their own personal capacity as opposed to that interest being indirect.56 The courts 
firmly applied the interpretation of this principle, in the case of Dalrymple and Others v 
Colonial Treasurer.57 In this case, it was stated that „no man can sue in respect of a wrongful 
act, unless it constitutes the breach of a duty owed to him by the wrongdoer or unless it 
causes him some damage in law‟.58 The application of the actio popularis action was hence 
completely done away with in this case, as in most public interest cases the litigants represent 
the interests of other individuals rather than acting on their own behalf.59 Establishing the 
existence of a direct or personal interest is a standard too high for public interest litigants to 
meet, as the interests they represent is one to which all citizens are granted by the law. 60  
An important court decision involving a public interest litigant under the common law was 
that delivered in the case of Bamford v Minister of Community Development and State 
Auxiliary Services.61 The importance of this case emanates from the effect of the judgment 
that was delivered by the court, a judgement that vindicated a public interest right. 
Watermeyer JP stated that regardless of the impermissibility of vindicating a public right 
under the then current law through an interdict, the remedy sought by the applicant had the 
similar effect of vindicating public interests and such could not be denied just because a 
single applicant sought such a  remedy.62 In this court case, the plaintiff who was a member 
of parliament sought an interdict restraining the respondent from erecting residences in a park 
falling under his constituency. The basis for the applicant‟s relief was that the public needed 
to have access to the park and such access would have been hindered if construction of the 
residences was allowed to continue.63 The judge in granting the requested interdict accepted 
that the interdict was one sought to vindicate the public‟s right, regardless of this not being 
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provided in the law.64 What can be taken from the decision in Bamford is not that the interdict 
was granted to an individual litigant, but the court‟s gradual acceptance of the fact that public 
rights needed to be protected in the same way as individual rights. The judge took a bold 
move away from the traditional position that single litigants cannot litigate on the basis of a 
public interest, despite being couched in an individualistic way.  
2.5 Public interest environmental litigation under the Constitution  
The challenges that PIL faced under the common law, and more specifically PIEL, were 
addressed in the Constitution.65 The Constitution takes a completely different position from 
the one previously provided for under the common law through the introduction of new 
concepts. The environmentalists‟ call for the recognition of an „ecological norm,‟66 or a 
„conservation ethic‟67were answered through the inclusion of the environmental right in 
section 24 of the Constitution. The environment was placed at the same level as all other 
political, socio and economic rights. Section 24 which forms the basis for all environmental 
laws applicable in South Africa states that everyone has the right:  
 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and  
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that: 
(i) prevents pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promotes conservation; and 
(iii) secures ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
 
However, having rights merely listed in the Constitution is not an answer in itself, a fact 
which was recognised by the drafters of the Constitution. The Constitution gives the state a 
special mandate to implement reasonable legislative and other measures that would ensure 
that an environment that is not harmful to people‟s health and well-being can be achieved. 
The meaning of the phrase „legislative measures‟ in the environmental right is self-evident, 
but there is no clear meaning for the phrase „other measures.‟ The phrase „other measures‟ is 
broad enough to include measures taken by public interest litigants in their bid to ensure that 
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the environmental right is given effect through seeking an interdict in a court of law.68 It is 
only through the integration of the state‟s legislative measures, and private sector‟s „other 
measures‟ that the vision of having an environment that is not harmful to one‟s health or 
well-being can be attained.  
 
Whilst recognising that the public and private sector‟s cooperation in the enforcement of the 
environmental right is imperative, the challenges that the public face in accessing the court 
were further addressed in section 38 of the Constitution. The Constitution widens the 
categories of parties that can have access to the courts from the previously held common law 
position. The effect of these exceptionally widened standing provisions allows for the 
possibility of „other measures‟ being implemented through the courts by the private sector.  
Section 38 states that:   
 
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a 
court are- 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own 
name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
 
The full attainment of the environmental right would have been ineffective had the locus 
standi restrictions that hindered public interest litigants‟ efforts under the common law 
continued to operate. The broadening of the standi provisions is effectively in line with the 
environmental right which recognises that „everyone‟ should live in an environment that is 
not harmful to their health and well-being. The possibility of improving the quality of life for 
all people and ensuring that they are able to reach their full free potential, can be achieved 
                                                          




when some public interest members who may not have a direct interest in the matter are 
given the leeway to act on behalf of others.69  
 
Falling in line with the liberated locus standi provisions and giving effect to the 
environmental right in the Constitution is section 32 of NEMA. The national environmental 
framework legislation in section 32 significantly extends the locus standi categories further 
than is provided for in the Constitution. Section 32 of NEMA headed „Legal standing to 
enforce environmental laws‟ states that:  
 
Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in respect of any breach or 
threatened breach of any provision of this Act, including a principle contained in 
Chapter 1, or of any provision of a specific environmental management Act, or of any 
other statutory provision concerned with the protection of the environment or the use of 
natural resources -  
(a) in that person‟s or group of person‟s own interest;  
(b) in the interest of, or on behalf of, a person who is, for practical reasons, 
unable to institute such proceedings;  
(c) in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose interests 
are affected;  
(d) in the public interest; and  
(e) in the interest of protecting the environment. 
 
The effect of the standing provisions in section 38(d) of the Constitution and section 32(d) of 
NEMA is that PIEL can occur in a simpler manner for the broader benefit of society than was 
the case presented under common law. The past clearly shows that it was too simplistic to 
presume that the state can effectively protect the public‟s interests effectively without the 
help of other role players, importantly in the form of public interest litigants.70 The state 
acknowledges these lessons from the past and shows its commitment to protecting the 
environment with the aid of  civil society in NEMA‟s preamble. The preamble of NEMA 
states „that the law should be enforced by the state and that the law should facilitate the 
enforcement of environmental laws by civil society.‟71 The locus standi provisions therefore 
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effectively pave the way for public interest litigants to help the State in the task of protecting 
the environment.  
 
A further important provision in NEMA is the considerable extension of the locus standi 
provisions beyond those recognised in section 38 of the Constitution. Public interest litigants 
may seek standing under NEMA to enforce the environmental right in the public interest, or 
in the interest of protecting the environment.72 This is an important provision given that at 
times the public may not have an identifiable interest in need of protection, instead the 
environment would be deteriorating and in need of protection. Public interest litigants 
effectively have the option of establishing standing in the Constitution and NEMA based on 
public interest, and more importantly in the interest of protecting the environment under 
NEMA. 
 
2.6 Public interest environmental litigation and remedies 
The discussion above shows that establishing the existence of direct sufficient interest was a 
major impediment preventing PIEL cases from appearing before the courts under the 
common law. In the few cases that public interest litigants sought to vindicate public interest, 
the courts dismissed the cases as the second standing requirement would not have been 
satisfied.73 It is from this point of view that one notices that the courts were more inclined to 
vindicate private rights, as opposed to incorporating the interest of the public. That same 
court system is the one that currently has been tasked with the responsibility of formulating 
remedies applicable to all cases that come before it. The courts in the common law era 
formulated remedies that were set to achieve the purpose of vindicating private rights. This 
position continued to operate without change, notwithstanding that the era in which these 
remedies were developed did not acknowledge the presence of the actio popularis action.74 
Public interests that are now provided for in the Constitution are equally worthy of adequate 
protection.  
 
The Constitution has since changed the previous position that hindered courts from 
recognising the standing of public interest litigants. The Constitution and NEMA have 
expressly extended the standing provision which caters for matters brought in the public 
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interest. The major problem for public interest litigants in South Africa is now more along the 
lines of the remedies that a court of law awards in a public interest case that seeks to protect 
the environment for the public, or the environments‟ interest.  
 
The interdict remedy under the common law was one where an applicant sought to protect his 
interests from being jeopardised by another individual, before a final decision was granted on 
trial. It is important to note the fact that only parties which were recognised as having 
standing to initiate the case or defend the claim in their individual or personal capacity, could 
approach the court. It is as such that the interdict relief was developed primarily for the 
reason of resolving disputes involving private individuals. 
 
It is interesting to note that whereas the concerns of private litigants and public interest 
litigants are so diverse from each other, the interdict remedy still seems to cater for private 
litigants. The diverseness of private and public interest litigants was acknowledged by 
O‟Regan in Ferreira v Levin NO.75 The judge stated that  
Existing common law rules of standing have often developed in the context of 
private litigation. As a general rule, private litigation is concerned with the 
determination of a dispute between two individuals, in which relief will be 
specific and, often, retrospective, in that it applies to a set of past events. Such 
litigation will generally not directly affect people who are not parties to the 
litigation. In such cases, the plaintiff is both the victim of the harm and the 
beneficiary of the relief. In litigation of a public character, however, that nexus is 
rarely so intimate. The relief sought is generally forward-looking and general in its 
application, so that it may directly affect a wide range of people. In addition, the 
harm alleged may often be quite diffuse or amorphous.76  
In light of such decisions made by the Apex court, one would think that remedies awarded by 
courts should take into account the different goals that are sought to be achieved from private 
and public interest litigation. The standing provisions as listed in section 38 of the 
Constitution and section 32 of NEMA need to be effectively given meaning to, and not by 
merely allowing public interest litigants access to the courts but through granting effective 
remedies. The common law interdict remedy may be regarded as not being capable of 
addressing environmental challenges independently as the remedy  seeks mainly to protect 
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and enforce private rights and their obligations with environmental  interests being protected 
when attached with private individual rights as was the case in Bamford77and Tergniet and 
Toekoms Action Group v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd.78 The expanded locus standi 
provisions on their own are ineffective in aiding the desire of public interest litigants to 
protect the environment in the public interest, or in the environment‟s own interest. For this 
reason, other measures may need to be adopted by the court, which in this case entails an 
expanded interpretation of the common law interdict requirements as will become more 
apparent from the discussion below. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The important role public interest litigant‟s play in a society such as South Africa cannot be 
over emphasised. Public interest litigants play an important role in the development of an 
environmental law jurisprudence, whilst at the same time playing the watchdog role over the 
state‟s enforcement function, and private individual‟s compliance with the law. The means of 
ensuring that social change is brought into the field of environmental law can be effectively 
undertaken by broadening the platform that accommodates public interest litigants. This 
platform has been granted in the Constitution and NEMA, but regardless of this remedies are 
still couched in a manner that seeks to vindicate claims akin to those raised under the 
common law era. The interdict remedy is one relief that falls under „other measures‟ that 
public interest litigants can seek in ensuring that an environment not harmful to one‟s health 
and well-being is attained.  
The next chapter will discuss the requirements of the interdict remedy and show how the 
remedy has traditionally been interpreted, and the problem that this interpretation entails for 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE COMMON LAW INTERDICT 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The meaning of PIEL and the important role it plays in the enforcement of the environmental 
right in South Africa has been explored in the preceding chapter. This chapter will focus on 
the common law interdict remedy; the requirements that need to be satisfied and the problems 
public interest litigants are likely to encounter when seeking this remedy in a court of law. 
This chapter will also discuss the two types of interdicts that public interest litigants may seek 
in enforcing environmental law compliance.  
3.2 The nature and importance of an interdict in environmental law 
An interdict is a court order that seeks to protect an existing right from an alleged illegitimate 
activity that may violate one‟s rights or statutory provisions.79 An interdict is the most 
suitable remedy that public interest litigants may seek in ensuring environmental compliance, 
due to the speed with which it may be obtained, and the impact it bears on addressing the 
harm. The interdict has the ability to put to an end any harmful activity at a very early stage 
before the harm can take effect. It can furthermore be stated that an interdict is „not a remedy 
for past invasion of rights, but is concerned with the present or the future‟80 thereby making it 
a suitable measure that can be taken to protect the environment. It has been described as an 
extra ordinary remedy and of a summary nature, which enables it to play an important role in 
protecting the environment.81 It is because of this that an interdict aids public interest litigants 
when taking a proactive intervention in protecting the environment.82   
The main purpose of PIEL is to prevent irreparable harm to the environment before it 
develops further. This purpose is in line with Lord Denning‟s assertion that „the delay of 
justice is a denial of justice.‟83 To address the goal of public interest litigants, a variety of 
remedies are placed at their disposal, but none seem more suited to address the goal that the 
common law interdict seeks to achieve. This invaluable implementation mechanism can 
prevent heritage buildings from being destroyed, wetlands being filled up and the air or water 
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contaminated.84 Given the wide standing provisions, public interest litigants can now seek 
invaluable relief and effectively guarantee a halt on continued harm to the environment.  
Application of the interdict remedy, in a bid to protect the environment has been 
acknowledged in other jurisdictions, such as Canada. In the case of MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v 
Mullin,85 the court stated that:  
 
The forest that the Indians know and use will be permanently destroyed….. the 
island‟s symbolic value will be gone. The subject matter of the trial will have been 
destroyed before the rights are decided …… The courts will not be able to do 
justice in the circumstances. That is the sort of result that the courts have 
attempted to prevent by granting injunctions. 
 
3.3 Types of interdicts  
In the environmental sphere, at least two scenarios usually present themselves in which 
public interest litigants seek an interdict from the courts. The first situation is where a private 
party performs an activity that is detrimental to the environment, with or without the 
knowledge of the unlawfulness of their activity. Secondly, public interest litigants could seek 
an interdict against a State department that has been granted the mandate of enforcing an 
environmental statute but is failing to live up to its mandate. Other situations under which 
interdicts can be sought include situations where a decision is pending review or in a 
damages claim.86 However the two types of scenarios that usually present themselves in 
environmental law described above can adequately be addressed in the form of a prohibitory 
or mandatory interdict. The nature of these two types of interdicts is the subject of discussion 
under the following subheadings: 
3.3.1 Prohibitory interdict 
A prohibitory interdict is an order that is granted by a court of law „requiring a person to 
abstain from committing a threatened wrong or from continuing an existing one.‟87 In the 
environmental context, this example presents itself for example when one makes illegal air 
emission into the atmosphere without a permit. This type of circumstance is the one that leads 
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a public interest litigant seeking a prohibitory interdict, as was done in the case of Tergniet.88 
The application for a prohibitory interdict in environmental protection is crucial to prevent 
damage caused to the environment which in most cases would be irreversible were the 
interdict not sought. A prohibitory interdict also has the ability to end harmful activities, or at 
least minimise the damage that may be caused to the environment.89  
 
In the case of Tergniet, a public interest litigant sought to interdict a wooden pole 
manufacturer who was violating provisions of two environmental laws. The respondent was 
violating provisions of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act,90 and the Land Use and 
Planning Ordinance.91 These statutes regulated the release of noxious and/or offensive gases 
into the atmosphere in a bid to give effect to the environmental right guaranteed in the 
Constitution.92 The respondent‟s defence against the court awarding the interdict was that 
since the statute provided for criminal sanctions, there was an alternative remedy than that 
wished by the respondents; and so the applicant‟s relief should have been denied. The court 
however disagreed with this assertion stating that the instigation of criminal sanctions for the 
infringement of APPA provisions would at times be woefully inadequate.93 Criminal 
sanctions in the environmental context are of little use in regulating anticipated future 
transgressions to the environment, and this had a bearing on the judge‟s decision.94 The judge 
came to the conclusion that in such circumstances, no other appropriate or alternative relief 
lies in the hands of the victim, other than a prohibitory interdict against the transgressor of the 
environmental statute to stop the pollution.95 
The importance of seeking a prohibitory interdict has also been acknowledged, even by 
governmental departments, as can be witnessed in the case Minister of Health and Welfare v 
Woodcarb.96 This case involved an interdict application by the minister against a sawmill 
producer that was operating in contravention of the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act.97 
Hurt J stated that since the act did not provide for specific remedies the minister or any other 
interested parties, could enforce against a party contravening the act, and could not be limited 
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to criminal penalties for contraventions of the act.98 The respondents were interdicted by the 
court from carrying on the wood burning process on the land under contention, and the right 
of the populace to live in an environment not detrimental to one‟s health and well-being was 
achieved.99 The court under the Interim Constitution clearly saw  the interdict as one of the 
only remedies available to ensure that an environment not detrimental to one‟s health or well-
being could be attained.100 
3.3.2 Mandatory interdict 
A mandatory interdict, unlike a prohibitory interdict, is an order that requires a person to do a 
„positive act to remedy a wrongful state of affairs for which he is responsible, or to do 
something which he ought to do.‟101 The purpose of a mandatory interdict is „to compel the 
performance of a specific statutory duty and to remedy effects of unlawful action already 
taken‟.102 The mandatory interdict (mandamus) is usually sought against public bodies in 
circumstances where that state department falls short of its statutory obligations.103 In these 
instances, the court orders that the state departments perform their statutory duties. Few 
mandamus interdicts have been granted by the courts due to the interdicts‟ enforcement 
challenges, but this has not deterred public interest litigants, in the form of PIEL, from 
seeking a mandamus in a bid to protect the environment.  
 
The case of the Wildlife Society of Southern Africa and others v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism,104 is one such scenario. A mandamus was sought against a state 
department for its failure to fulfil its statutory obligations. The applicants in this case were 
seeking an interdict that would compel the state department to enforce provisions under the 
Environment Conservation Act.105 The provisions prohibited the development and 
establishment of buildings within the restricted Transkei coastal conservation area.106 The 
court in this instance granted the mandamus against the state department. Pickering J found 
that decisive measures needed to be taken by the government department against the illegal 
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land practice by users, especially since the measures that had been taken before were 
indicative of a totally ineffective and unsuitable manner to address the imperative problem.107 
 
Although the Wildlife Society case was decided under the now repealed section of the 
Environment Conservation Act,108 this decision has a bearing on the application of other 
statutes in effect. One such environmental statute, in terms of which a mandamus may be 
sought, is the National Water Act (NWA).109 Section 155 of the NWA gives the minister of 
water the power to interdict a party violating the water legislation provisions. Public interest 
litigants may seek a mandamus compelling the minister to direct any individual contravening 
the NWA to discontinue with any such activity, and to remedy adverse effects that would 
have arisen from such contraventions, since he acts as a trustee of the nation‟s water 
resources.110 
In a recent case of Kloof Conservancy v Government of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others111 the court was faced with a similar instance in which a mandamus was sought by 
public interest litigants against the government. The government through the various 
departments had failed to publish and apply an alien invasive species list as per the mandate 
required in chapter 5 of the National Environmental Biodiversity Act (NEMBA). The failure 
by the government to publish the invasive species‟ regulations effectively rendered the whole 
section of the Act redundant and frustrated the efforts of citizens willing to fight alien and 
invasive species.112 Vahed J after looking at the totality of circumstances and the government 
actions, held that the government‟s actions in failing to publish the list by the 31st August 
2006, as mandated under NEMBA was unlawful and unconstitutional.113 The various 
respondents in the case, were instructed to ensure that all steps that are deemed necessary and 
within their authority under the law had to be taken to ensure that every organ of state in 
every sphere of government complies with the obligations under section 76(2) and (4) of 
NEMBA requiring the preparation of the invasive species lists.114 This case illustrates the 
important role that public interest litigants play in ensuring that environmental compliance 
takes place effectively through remedies such as the mandamus interdict. 
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3.4 The interdict requirements 
The common law interdict, though sharing similarities with the English law injunction 
remedy is grounded upon Roman-Dutch law principles.115 The requirements that a party 
needs to satisfy in an interdict application have been maintained as per the writings of Van 
der Linden in relation to a mandament poenaal application.116 The writings of Van der 
Linden were an important guide to the court‟s formulation of the final interdict requirements 
in the case of Setlogelo v Setlogelo.117  
The requirements flowing from this case have been maintained over the years in their solid 
form. In order to obtain a final interdict, an applicant needs to show the presence of a clear 
right, an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and lastly, an absence of 
similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.118 In an interim interdict application, the 
requirements are slightly different to those required in a final interdict application. The  
applicant would need to establish the existence of a prima facie right; the apprehension of 
irreparable harm; that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interdict and 
lastly the absence of any other satisfactory remedy.119 The requirements discussed above in 
relation to an interim or final interdict application have subtle yet significant differences.120  
The interim and final interdict requirements differ in regards to the threshold level that has to 
be established and the number of requirements that have to be satisfied. In order to be granted 
an interim interdict, the right only has to be prima facie established even if it is open to some 
doubt.121  
This is in contrast to a final interdict application in which the right has to be „clear‟: an 
applicant would need to prove on a balance of probabilities, the right which he seeks to 
protect.122 Furthermore, the interim interdict has an extra requirement of balance of 
convenience.123 The focus of this study will however dwell primarily on the final interdict as 
opposed to the interim interdict. Focus is given to the final interdict because it is the one that 
calls for a „permanent cessation of the unlawful course of conduct or state of affairs‟124 hence 
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fulfilling the ultimate aim of PIEL, whereas with an interim interdict the parties would still 
need to return to court for the final determination of the order.125 The interpretation of the 
final interdict requirements by the courts will now be assessed, whilst also showing how 
PIEL may find it difficult to show that requirement. 
3.4.1 Clear right 
The first requirement that a party seeking an interdict has to show is the existence of a clear 
right. One needs to bring forth substantive evidence before a court of law for it to determine 
whether there exists a clear right, based on facts produced.126 The evidence that one presents 
before a court of law should be able to show the existence of a clear legal right, rather than a 
mere moral right.  
In most environmental law related matters that came before the courts in the pre 
constitutional law era, a clear right was shown on the basis of property law rights.127 The 
interdict was mainly sought in nuisance related matters. The applicant would usually 
complain that the respondent‟s conduct of making noise,128 odours,129 smoke130 and pollution 
related activities interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property. Nuisance and 
neighbour law was the only substantive law that could aid in preventing harm to the 
environment. The courts only recognised the applicant‟s clear right to a healthy environment 
within the immediate vicinity of the applicant because of reliance on neighbour law. The act 
that an applicant complained of had to be one that amounted to a nuisance, or would cause 
harm to the applicant for it to be protected under neighbour law.  
Protecting the environment on a broader spectrum has been a greater challenge as discussed 
in chapter two. However, before the advent of the Constitution and environmental statutes, 
property law played an important role in preventing environmentally harmful activities to the 
immediate parties involved. 
Public interest litigants would most probably have difficulty in showing the existence of a 
clear right due to the absence of an identifiable natural person present, to show how the clear 
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right to a healthy environment was being infringed. In most environmental, law-related 
interdict applications, an identifiable natural person applies for the interdict, and therefore is 
able to show how the clear right to a healthy environment is in need of protection. A litigant 
seeking an interdict in their personal capacity feels the consequences of an infringement of 
the clear right to a healthy environment in their individual capacity, as opposed to public 
interest litigants who cannot use the same argument.  In a public interest case, the health of 
the parties is not immediately under threat; rather the litigation is done because of the 
public‟s interest in the health of the environment.131 Public interest litigants are unlikely to be 
able to convince the court of a clear right to an environment not harmful to health, but can 
seek to rely on the right to an environment that is not harmful to their well-being.132  
 
The approach adopted by the court in interpreting a clear right in current constitutional law 
has been maintained from when it was applied in the pre constitutional law era. The courts 
still interpret the clear right requirement as intractably linked with an identifiable natural 
person - usually an applicant in the litigation matter. A case in which the courts have not been 
prepared to go beyond the physical, and including the aesthetic or spiritual dimension of the 
environmental right, is in the case of Paola v Jeeva NO and Others.133 The case involved an 
appeal by the applicant against a decision that had been made in relation to the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act.134 The decision taken in terms of the act 
allowed for alterations to occur to the neighbour‟s property, which effectively hindered the 
applicant‟s view from his own property. The court held that allowing such an interest to be 
protected „would result in chaos and create great confusion in the development world‟.135 
This decision was however reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal, holding that the loss of 
a view was a factor that should be taken into account since it had a bearing on the property‟s 
value.136 The proposed development was noted as having the effect of being able to 
„significantly diminish the value of the applicants adjoining property,‟137 which was contrary 
to applicable legislation. In this instance, although the court attached the market value notion, 
it did not unequivocally accept the same value as being aesthetic in nature, which is 
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unfortunate.138 The author of this dissertation is of the view that the court could have still 
reached a similar conclusion by also having placed emphasis on the aesthetic value the 
applicant placed on nature, a view other people also hold in high esteem.  
 
Interpreting the interdict requirements in such a light diminishes the extended locus standi 
provisions and the environmental right in the Constitution. Public interest litigants, seeking to 
protect the environment in the form of PIEL, should be able to utilise the constitutional right 
and environmental statutes as a basis of showing their clear right. The courts however, have 
not been easily persuaded by such an assertion in finding a clear right, as reflected in the case 
of Tergniet discussed above.  
 
In the case of Tergniet the applicants requested a final interdict and sought to establish a clear 
right based on the fact that they were residents in the area concerned. The court merely 
accepted this argument without further explanation that the:  
 
applicants as residents and/or property owners living in close proximity to the first 
respondent's property have a fundamental right to an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being and to have the environment protected for the 
benefit of present and future generations.139  
 
The applicants ought to have been able to satisfy this requirement of a clear right based on 
the Constitution.140 The court however in this instance linked the clear right requirement with 
the second requirement of harm, which would be felt by the residents in their individual 
capacity.141 The clear right the court recognises is one where the environment will not cause 
health effects to individuals, and the protection of the environment on itself has not been 
given much attention. The judge was unlikely to have easily come to the conclusion that a 
„clear right‟ requirement had been fulfilled if the interdict had been sought in the public 
interest alone.  
Another case involving a private interdict application with important bearing on a public 
interest litigants‟ application for an interdict is that of Interwaste (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
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Coetzee and Others.142 The court in this case did not accept that a „clear right‟ could be 
established merely on the basis of contravention of an environmental statute. The applicants 
in this case were seeking to interdict the respondents from operating a landfill site 
unlawfully.143 Section 20 of the National Environmental Management Waste Act144 required 
one to have a licence in order to operate a landfill site; the respondent in this case did not 
have such a licence. The applicants relied on the lack of a licence as the basis upon which 
they sought to show that they had a „clear right‟ that warranted their interdicting the 
respondent‟s activities.‟145 The judge was however not „convinced‟ that the respondent‟s 
activities of operating a landfill site without a licence per se gave the applicants a clear 
right.146 It is important to note that in the eyes of the court, a clear right is only one which is 
„palpable, tangible or real‟ as opposed to being abstract or hypothetical.147  
 
Horn JP‟s response in relation to how one can establish a clear right shows how difficult it 
would be for public interest litigants to show that they had a clear right which was in need of 
protection, as provided for in the legislative provisions. The statutes, by requiring a party to 
operate with a licence are actually seeking to protect everyone‟s clear right to an environment 
that is not harmful to their health or well-being.  The enforcement of this right has been given 
solely to the state, but this does not warrant indiscriminate continuance of violation of the 
statute provisions, and should be enforced even by the public. Public interest litigants 
however find it increasingly difficult to establish the existence of a clear right based on 
constitutional or environmental statute contravention. 
 
Public interest litigants would also find it difficult to enforce public-centred legislation since 
the clear right to enforce such statutes is, in the courts view, the responsibility of the state. 
The interpretation of the clear right requirement on this basis maintains a counterproductive 
pre constitution era mentality. In the Interwaste148 case, the judge stated that one cannot act 
as an enforcer of environmental legislation which „falls squarely within the domain of the 
environmental authorities who are after all directly responsible for the enforcement of the 
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environmental legislation‟.149 The courts‟ view in such matters is still based on the common 
law interpretation of the clear right requirement, which sees the State as the only enforcer of 
public rights. In this light, the enforcement of statutes would mean that in most cases public 
interest litigants would require permission from a government department if they were to 
succeed in establishing a clear right based on the breach of a statute, regardless of the s32 
provisions of NEMA being applicable.150  
3.4.2 Injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended 
The second requirement that public interest litigation needs to show is with regards to an 
injury actually committed, or which is reasonably apprehended.151 The applicant seeking an 
interdict should, on the facts brought before the court, establish that an invasion of the 
applicant's right would result in him/her facing prejudice or injury.152 This requirement flows 
from the clear right requirement that is needed to be established as discussed above. A link 
usually exists between the clear right that one alleges to be under threat in the first 
requirement, would most likely result in injury emanating to the plaintiff.   
There is dissonance in the courts‟ interpretation of the injury or harm requirement in the 
environmental law context. Currently, the courts still interpret the requirement of injury or 
harm from an individual‟s point of view. However, this requirement ought to be satisfied 
based on the statutory or constitutional right to prevent harm to the environment.153 The 
courts are usually convinced that the injury requirement is satisfied, when the act complained 
of results in detrimental health effects to specific litigants, not the general public. The word 
„injury‟ is taken to mean an act that interferes with the applicant‟s rights with regards to his 
person or property, and that result in prejudice.154 The interpretation of the injury requirement 
in this manner refutes the efforts made by public interest litigants when exercising the 
environmental rights in the Constitution, given effect in the environmental statutes.155  
The challenge that public interest litigants face in establishing the injury requirement flows 
from the „rule‟ in Patz v Greene and Co.156 In the case of Patz,157 the court stated that where 
a litigant relies on statutes that are enacted for the general public, and when seeking an 
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interdict on grounds of that statute‟s contravention, one would need to establish special 
damages suffered.158 The applicant has to show that the injury or damages s/he is 
experiencing, as opposed to what other members of the public are experiencing, is unique.159 
The approach adopted in Patz160 has been followed consistently with approval in two other 
environmental law-related cases in the public interest, both before and after the Constitution.  
In Verstappen v Port Edward Town Board and Others,161 the first respondent, a local 
municipality was operating a waste disposal site without a permit as required by section 20(1) 
of the ECA.162 The applicant, who co-owned a property situated near the waste disposal site 
sought to interdict the first respondent from any activities akin to disposal of waste. The 
applicant‟s basis for seeking an interdict was that disposal of the waste was amounting to a 
nuisance. The alternative basis on which the applicant based the application was that the 
waste disposal site was operating unlawfully.163 The court dismissed the interdict application 
on the basis that the applicant lacked locus standi. It also reiterated the decision taken in Patz 
that one needed to prove that the applicant has suffered or would suffer special damage due to 
the continued act.  
The court in Laskey and Another v Showzone CC and Others,164 decided after the advent of 
the Constitution, to follow the trend set in Patz. This case was one where the applicants were 
seeking to interdict the respondent from making a noise nuisance based on the noise control 
regulations. This is the similar conclusion that was reached in the case of Patz165 that found 
out that the noise control regulation had been enacted in the public interests. The court 
emphatically reiterated that where injury is actually committed or reasonably apprehended, 
the respondent‟s conduct should have given rise to a private nuisance for it to be 
actionable.166 It follows that in all statutes enacted in the public interest, one needs to show 
harm to themselves in their individual capacity. Freedman, in regards to the Showzone case, 
was disappointed that courts made use of the common law rules which effectively made the 
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regulations enacted from the statute redundant.167 The common law rules were seen as 
severely curtailing the complainant‟s ability to bring actions seeking to enforce statutes in 
cases where the applicants brought such an action not in their own interests but rather in the 
environment‟s interests, or that of the general public.168 This has been a common trend in 
most environmental legislation that seeks to protect the general population. Apart from the 
other reasons that Freedman disagrees with, in the judgement in Showzone he states that 
Binns-Ward AJ missed an opportunity to clarify how legal standing mentioned in section 32 
of NEMA and final interdict requirements are linked, in particular the applicants need to 
show the presence of a clear right and that one‟s rights have been infringed by the 
defendant.169 
It would be very difficult, given the nature of the environmental statutes, for PIEL to show 
the existence of the injury or harm requirement in order to be granted an interdict. 
Environmental statutes are generally enacted in the interests of protecting the public, or the 
environment, as opposed to protecting the interest of private parties. The strict interpretation 
of injury based on ownership rights, or alternatively showing special damage, almost renders 
it impossible for public interest litigants to establish this requirement. The courts currently 
continue to disregard the changed environment in which such legislation now applies.170 The 
usefulness of the interdict for enforcing public centred legislation can in the current 
constitutional era be seriously questioned.171 Public interest litigants may find it very difficult 
to satisfy this requirement, as it is the environment that‟s suffering the actual physical injury, 
and not the particular litigant bringing the court action.172  
3.4.3 No alternative remedy  
This last requirement in respect of which  the court needs to be satisfied before granting a 
final interdict in a PIEL application, is in relation to there not being any other „satisfactory‟ or 
„appropriate relief‟ available to the applicant.173 The court takes this requirement seriously 
due to the fact that an interdict is of an extraordinary and summary nature.174 Therefore a 
court is more cautious in granting an interdict where the possibility exists for another remedy 
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that can bring about the same outcome the applicant seeks. The most commonly considered 
alternative relief to interdict applications is the aquilian action or criminal sanctions.  
 
The requirement that there should be no alternative remedy does not usually prove difficult 
for public interest litigants to establish. This is because the mere existence of other remedies 
which a court may grant does not warrant the denial of an interdict relief. The courts assess 
the alternative relief to see whether there are „better‟ remedies, and also whether they can be 
expeditiously sought to secure a similar goal to that which the interdict seeks to achieve.175 
The alternative relief has to be adequate in those circumstances; be ordinary and reasonable; 
has to be a legal remedy and a remedy able to grant similar protection.176 Delictual177 and 
criminal sanctions178 have been considered as alternative remedies in interdict applications. 
However, the shortcomings of the criminal and aquilian action as alternative remedies in the 
environmental sphere have all been well documented.179 These two types of remedies cannot 
be considered as adequate alternative remedies in a PIEL interdict application, although some 
courts will still award them instead of an interdict.  
 
The courts‟ interpretation of this remedy has been more along the lines of addressing 
persistent unlawful conduct rather than on-going harm to the environment. The goal of public 
interest litigants is to protect the environment against irreplaceable damage through proactive 
remedies, which at times are overlooked.180 However in Verstappen181 the court accepted that 
in environmental law, proactive remedies may be required and this takes the form of an 
interdict to which a damages claim will unlikely be a satisfactory alternative.182 The same can 
be said of criminal sanctions which are retrospective by seeking to address past actions. 
Criminal sanctions are aimed at improving the future and not immediately correcting harm. In 
this light, the interdict remedy will be the most suitable relief in the environmental law 
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context that guarantees protection of the environment against further harm occurring to the 
environment.  
 
The interdict remedy is the better suited remedy to fulfil the goal of public interest litigants. 
The environment and the „ecosystems are generally irreplaceable‟183 and the interdict may be 
the only remedy that the court may grant in order to prevent harm before it arises. However, 
regardless of the courts being convinced of the absence of another suitable relief to an 
interdict, the remedy will not be granted when the other two requirements discussed above, 
are not satisfied.  All three requirements need to have been satisfied at the beginning, before 
the interdict remedy can be awarded.  
3.5 Conclusion   
The discussion above has focused on the requirements that need to be satisfied before a court 
in South Africa grants a final interdict. These requirements have not changed since their 
adaptation from the writings of Van der Linden, making it difficult to accommodate public 
interest litigants. PIEL was not recognised under the common law, and enforcement of public 
statutes was generally the sole responsibility of the state. The Constitution and various 
environmental statutes have now recognised the need for inter sectorial enforcement and 
partnership, but this has not been adopted universally as reflected in the cases highlighted in 
this chapter.184  
The next chapter therefore will look closely at how the courts, given the wide tool of 
interpretation, can accommodate public interest litigants seeking to enforce public statutes 
and rights. An alternative discussion will debate whether the common law needs a new tool to 
be formulated in order to achieve the goal of public interest litigants.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF 
4.1 Introduction  
Environmental protection requires swift and effective remedies when parties approach a court 
of law. While PIEL has played an important role in trying to protect the environment, efforts 
in the past have been hampered by some procedural aspects. The various challenges faced by 
public interest litigants have been discussed in the preceding chapters, particularly the 
remedies a court of law awards in the litigation process. The inherent limitation of an 
interdict‟s remedy is that it mainly provides for the protection of a private litigant‟s 
environmental needs, a view that existed in the past industrialised society.185 This view has 
drastically changed as the Constitution now protects the public needs, which the interdict 
remedy should also reflect.  
The Constitution and various environmental statutes have acknowledged the importance of 
PIEL, and this appreciation should also be reflected in the remedies granted in the litigation 
process. This chapter will discuss how courts may adapt the common law interdict in order to 
accommodate public interest litigants. In the alternative, a discussion of what constitutes 
appropriate relief will be undertaken. 
4.2 Extended interpretation of the interdict requirements 
A public interest litigant‟s main challenge in being granted the common law interdict, relates 
to showing the presence of a clear right, and injury or harm apprehended. These common law 
requirements need to be redeveloped in order to accommodate the new challenges to which 
the Constitution has sought to address, by introducing new concepts and principles.186  
4.2.1 Establishing a clear right  
The absence of an individual‟s ability to show a clear right is one of the main challenges that 
hinder a public interest litigant‟s request for a final interdict. The courts may develop the 
common law by accepting that a public interest litigant satisfies the clear right requirement, 
based on a literal reading of the constitutional or legislative environmental right. Developing 
the law in this manner would make the courts accommodate public interest cases within the 
ambit of the Setlogelo187 interdict requirements.    
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The first challenge that a litigant seeking a final interdict faces is convincing the court about 
the presence of a clear right. The Constitution or the environmental statutes should be able to 
be used as a basis upon which a clear right is shown to exist in both private and public 
interest litigation cases. The Constitution acting as the supreme law of the land, and binding 
on all organs of state has given everyone a right to an environment that is not harmful to 
one‟s health and well-being.188 This right alone should be enough for public interest litigants 
to show that they have a clear right that is in need of protection through an interdict remedy.  
 
The answer to the challenges discussed above can be found in section 32 of NEMA which 
provides for what could be regarded as a clear right, in that the public have the right to act as 
the enforcer of environmental legislation. Section 32 of NEMA expressly states that one can 
seek appropriate relief for breach of provisions to the act or any of the guiding environmental 
principles listed in the act. The application of section 32 of NEMA is akin to that of section 
38 of the Constitution, which also allows for the public to act as enforcer of environmental 
legislation in enforcing public centred legislation. This view was mentioned with approval in 
the case of Ferreira.189  In this case, the court stated that one can act as an enforcer of 
environmental legislation when one can: 
 
a. Allege that one of the fundamental rights set in the Bill of Rights has been infringed 
or threatened: and 
b. Show that one of the categories of persons listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) has a 
„sufficient interest‟ in obtaining a remedy.190 
 
Currie and De Waal further reinforce this assertion stating that the only determining factor 
that should enable one to act as an enforcer of environmental legislation, is whether there has 
been a violation of a right set in the Bill of Rights and show sufficient interest in the remedy 
sought.191  The concept of sufficient interest has to be generously interpreted and not be 
restrictively interpreted taking note of the case that is brought before the court.192 In this light, 
the desire to protect the environment ought to suffice as sufficient interest to which public 
interest litigants have a clear right to act to protect the various environmental statutes.  
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The judiciary‟s approach to the clear right requirement requires adaptation to meet the needs 
of the general public.193 The need for a different approach in relation to public guaranteed 
rights was also recognised in Save the Vaal  Environment.194 The court stated that: 
Our Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental, justiciable 
human rights, by necessary implication requires that environmental considerations 
be accorded appropriate recognition and respect in the administrative processes in 
our country. Together with the change in the ideological climate must also come a 
change in our legal and administrative approach to environmental concerns.195 
The judiciary can show the public that a new legal climate now exists by acknowledging that 
public interest litigants have a clear right to a healthy environment as enshrined in the 
constitution. Environmental issues that were often ignored in the past have now been given 
their rightful prominence and weight, through their inclusion in a justiciable environmental 
right found in the Constitution.196 The right that public interest litigants seek to protect is a 
clear right to an environment that is not harmful to one‟s health or well-being, as recognised 
in the Constitution.197 It is submitted that Carstensen AJA in Vaal Justice Environmental 
Alliance v Company Secretary of Arcelormittal South Africa Ltd and others,198 correctly 
recognised that for the effective enforcement of the environmental right: 
An association of person, each of whom have the right in terms of s24 (a) can bind 
together to enforce their rights… [and] even if I have extended the meaning of s24 
(a), I have no doubt that s24 (b) is applicable and assists the applicant following 
the sentiments expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal that “together with the 
change in the ideological climate must also come a change in the legal and 
administrative approach to environmental concerns.”199  
The protection of the environment is something to which parties involved in public litigation 
hold dearly, and one which courts should equally protect in the same manner that people‟s 
health is protected through the traditional clear right interpretation. According to Glazewski:  
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In the environmental context, the potential ambit of a right to 'well-being' is 
exciting but potentially limitless. The words nevertheless encompass the essence 
of environmental concern, namely a sense of environmental integrity; a sense that 
we ought to utilise the environment in a morally responsible and ethical manner. If 
we abuse the environment we feel a sense of revulsion akin to the position where a 
beautiful and unique landscape is destroyed, or an animal is cruelly treated.200 
The phrase „well-being‟ by Glazewski was given the stamp of approval by Murphy J in HTF 
Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.201 The court stated 
that the term well-being should be seen as one that is „open-ended and manifestly [….] 
incapable of precise definition‟.202 It is evident that the courts ought to protect the spiritual 
and psychological value people ascribe to the environment since the environment itself 
cannot enforce such a right.203 The environmental well-being has to be protected so that the 
public‟s „sense of environmental security and safekeeping‟204 is protected just as any other 
socio-economic rights are protected. Protection of the environment by public interest litigants 
cannot only be attributed to health reasons, since others feel a moral responsibility and a 
desire to protect the environment. In this instance a right that is established requires no 
further substantiation.  
Glazewski and Murphy J have noted that they are in agreement that parties who have an 
interest in protecting the environment have a clear right to have the environment protected 
from any threatening act. When litigating in the interests of the environment, the persistent 
allowance of illegally detrimental activities that interfere with the environmental integrity can 
be taken as infringing on other people‟s right to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or well-being.205 On the other hand, the public right is infringed each time an activity 
occurs which interferes with the ordinary comfort of human beings.206   
The interpretation of the word „well-being‟ in a broad manner, as mentioned above is also in 
line with how other constitutionally enshrined rights have been interpreted. The court in 
Ferreira207 advocated for the adoption of a broad approach to interpreting constitutional 
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issues. Chaskalson P stated that broadly interpreting standing „would be consistent with the 
mandate given to this Court to uphold the Constitution and would serve to ensure that 
constitutional rights enjoy the full measure of protection to which they are entitled‟.208 The 
same rationale can be extended to the protection of the environment, since a healthy 
environment, and its continued well-being, needs to be protected whilst simultaneously 
protecting individuals‟ rights to a healthy environment. The courts should endeavour to give a 
broad interpretation to environmental rights, as not only are the litigant‟s own rights under 
threat, but other parties may also face similar rights‟ violations but unable to access the 
courts.209  
In a bid to avoid this obstacle, most public interest litigants seeking an interdict to protect the 
environment, establish the clear right requirement based on the unlawful activity the 
defendant will be undertaking. This trend is evident in the recent undecided court case of 
Mapungubwe Action Group and Others v Limpopo Coal (PTY) Ltd and Others.210 The 
applicants in this case are seeking three interdicts against the defendant namely the use of 
water interdict, the nature reserve interdict and an overall interim interdict. The applicants‟ 
clear right to water interdict rests upon the defendants‟ use of water in breach of section 4 and 
22 (1) of the NWA as opposed to either the environmental right or the general public right to 
clean water, which this author is suggesting should be enough to meet this requirement. The 
public interest litigant‟s failure to use  the constitutional or legislative environmental right as 
a basis on which the clear right requirement can be established evidently shows how this is a 
challenge, leaving public interest litigants establishing this requirement based upon violation 
of statute.211 
It follows the discussion above that the courts should change the manner in which they 
approach the environmental right, given that the Constitution has clearly granted the public a 
clear right of protecting the environment. For one to be granted a final interdict, he or she 
should be able to establish the clear right requirement on the basis of the Constitution, or on 
statutes‟ wide interpretation of the term „well-being‟. However, this is not the only challenge 
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public interest litigants have to face before being granted an interdict. Another challenge 
needing to be addressed is the second requirement for an interdict application, and this relates 
to an injury actually committed. The courts‟ approach to public interest litigants fulfilling this 
requirement is the focus of the next discussion. 
4.2.2 Injury requirement 
The common perception that actual injury, or irreparable harm, manifests itself through 
physical harm or pecuniary loss lacks authority. The courts need to move away from the 
traditional understanding of injury such that public interest litigants can be able to show 
actual injury or irreparable harm requirement. The physical consequences that one usually 
suffers as a result of a particular act are merely incidental to the unlawful activity that would 
have been undertaken.212 V&A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Helicopter and 
Marine Services (Pty) Ltd and Others,213 is authority to the fact that whilst physical injury is 
the most common means of proving the manifestation of injury that occurs, it is not the only 
form. Howie P in his own words stated that: 
It is hard to imagine that a rights invasion will not be effected most often by way 
of physical conduct but to prove the necessary injury or harm it is enough to show 
that a right has been invaded. The fact that physical means were employed or 
physical consequences sustained is incidental.214 
Injury or harm is only rightfully physically felt in the physical in most political and social 
rights, but is different when such a right sought be protected is an environmental right. Injury 
to the environment or the public‟s environmental right, does not need to have a physical 
attribute especially where on-going injury and breach of the clear right is occurring.215 In the 
event of on-going violation to the environment, the continued occurrence of the illegal 
activity causes harm and injury to the environment and also to the people living in that 
environment.216 The main aim of an interdict is to help prevent such situations from occurring 
in the first place, since the physical harm has spill-over effects which are usually irreparable. 
217 The contention in environmental protection is always based on the premise that prevention 
is more effective than the cure that is sought after the fact. 
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Furthermore, the continued strict application of the „rule‟ in Patz218 in today‟s constitutional 
era is misplaced, since it was introduced to deal with circumstances where public interest 
litigation was not tolerated.219 The Constitution has now clarified the position of public 
interest litigants in section 38, and the continued application of the Patz220 principle is 
unwarranted as it now lacks relevance.221 The implication of doing away with the „rule‟ in 
Patz by the courts means that in environmental statutes enacted for the public benefit, the 
requirement of showing special damage would not be necessary. The applicants would not 
necessarily need to wait until their rights are infringed or to have suffered some loss before 
attempting to institute a court action. Public interest litigants seeking to enforce 
environmental statutes would only have to show that they are suffering injury as a result of a 
breach of their clear environmental right.  
4.3 Development of the common law  
The courts are bestowed with a virtually impossible challenge when it comes to assessing 
whether there is any other satisfactory or appropriate relief in the event that public interest 
litigants cannot be granted an interdict. In most court applications, applicants seek a specific 
relief, or in the alternative, appropriate relief as per the constitutional and legislative 
enactments. The Constitution contains numerous provisions that allow for courts to come up 
with new remedies where a constitutional right has been infringed. This is a scenario 
permitted by both the Constitution and NEMA to which public interest litigants can also seek 
the court to consider. It is arguable that interpreting the common law interdict remedy, within 
these traditional boundaries, is inadequate as a means of protecting the environmental right, 
hence the need for new remedies.  
The discussion above showed the manner in which the interdict requirements may be 
developed in order to accommodate public interest litigants within the traditional interdict 
requirements. If the courts find that the clear right requirement can be satisfied based on the 
constitutional right, and that the continued occurrence of an illegal activity satisfies the harm 
requirement, then development of the common law would not be necessary since the remedy 
so desired would be granted. However, if the courts do not find favour with the above 
interpretations in order to accommodate public interest litigants, the courts would need to 
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grant appropriate relief in those instances. Section 38 of the Constitution permits the courts 
to grant appropriate relief for the alleged infringement of any of the enshrined rights included 
in the bill of rights. Section 32 of NEMA mandates courts to grant appropriate relief with a 
broader application to breach of the act, the environmental principles, provisions of specific 
environmental statutes or any provision that seeks to protect the environment and the natural 
resources.222  
A prerequisite for the courts to look into developing the common law and granting 
appropriate relief was set out in the Hichange223 case, where Leach J stated that: 
Two stages which cannot be hermetically separated from each other [have] to be 
considered in developing the common law beyond existing precedent. The first is 
to consider whether the existing common law requires development in accordance 
with the objectives set out in s 39(2) of the Constitution, an inquiry requiring a 
reconsideration of the common law in the light of s 39(2). It is only when this 
inquiry leads to a positive answer that the court is called upon to concern itself 
with the second stage viz how such development is to take place in order to meet 
the s 39(2) objectives. 
 
The common failure by the courts to accept the need for a broad interpretation of the interdict 
requirements in the manner discussed would necessarily mean that the first test set out in the 
Hichange case is satisfied.224 The common law interdict remedy would in that instance be 
rendered inadequate to address the needs of PIEL. The second requirement of the test as set 
out by Leach J would be the next logical step on how the law ought to be developed.  
The trends and developments in which the courts are interpreting the field of law that comes 
before them arguably leads to the call that environmental concerns need similar attention. The 
common law interdict remedy, as it has been applied prior to the enactment of the 
constitution calls for developments inclusive of how legal practitioners make submissions to 
the court in environmental matters. These sentiments are echoed in the words of Blackmun J 
in the United States of America, where he stated that such development does not necessarily 
mean that there should be: 
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Run-of-the-mill litigation… if only we choose to acknowledge and reach then-
significant aspects of a wide, growing and disturbing problem, that is, the Nation‟s 
and the worlds deteriorating environment  with its resulting ecological 
disturbances. Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible 
that we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods and traditional 
concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate for new issues? 
 
The starting point to developing the common law is section 8(3) of the Constitution that 
applies specifically where a provision of the bill of rights has been infringed. Section 8(3) 
commands the courts to develop the common law to the extent to which legislation has not 
given effect to that right where necessary.225 The courts‟ role in this area is of vital 
importance: they ought to remain vigilant in ensuring that the common law is developed to 
reflect and „promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bills of Rights‟.226 The judiciary 
should aid public interest litigants‟ efforts to give effect to the environmental right by 
developing the common law as discussed below.     
4.4 The meaning of appropriate relief  
The matter that an applicant brings before a court of law is usually the guiding factor that the 
courts use in formulating what can be ascribed to as appropriate relief. In most instances the 
aggrieved party seeks to be placed in a similar position they held prior to the violation of their 
right.227 The courts, as a result seek to balance the interests of all parties affected by the 
infringement of the constitutional right so that the relief awarded achieves this aim.228 The 
corrective justice approach is however unsuitable in addressing public interest environmental 
concerns since it benefits the immediate court litigants as opposed to the public at large.229  
A better approach in formulating an appropriate remedy is to address environmental concerns 
through the distributive justice approach. A distributive justice remedy serves the broader 
interests of society and at the same time incidentally provides for individual interests of the 
litigants.230 This is particularly important in the environmental law context where 
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infringement of the environmental right that affects various citizens should be addressed in 
one court action.231 Appropriate relief in the environmental arena is one that would weigh the 
effects of non-compliance and the long term effectiveness of the relief, whilst serving the 
interests of both present and future generations.232 The court has to be satisfied that the 
appropriate remedy will in the end address the wrong that has been done, deter future 
violations, and also that the compliance with the order granted can be monitored.233 These 
three concerns considered by the court are pivotal for the advancement of any constitutional 
right since most people have challenges accessing the courts. In the end, the relief that the 
court grants has an impact on how parties conform to the constitutional rights and deter future 
violations.234 
4.5 Courts’ approach to appropriate relief 
Over the years, the courts have battled to give meaning to the phrase „appropriate relief‟ 
mainly in the area of socio-economic rights. The courts‟ approach in social grant cases 
provides insightful guidance and precedent as to how the courts should develop 
environmental rights‟ remedies in public environmental interests. The court in the case of 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security235 saw that the common law and constitutional 
remedies were inadequate in addressing the needs of the applicants. This can be noted where 
the court held that: 
Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce 
the Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief 
may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as 
may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are 
protected and enforced. If it is necessary to do so, the courts may even fashion 
new remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of these important 
rights.236 
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The courts have been guided by the nature of the right that has been infringed, and means that 
such right has been infringed.237 Central to the courts‟ final decision in all instances is what 
the courts would consider to be an effective remedy in those circumstances.238 
The need to protect the litigant‟s constitutional rights by granting appropriate relief was 
considered in the Mahambehlala239 and Mbanga240 cases. These two cases involved litigants 
whose social grants had been unlawfully terminated, and the administrative system did not 
provide for the necessary relief. Elite J in Mahambehlala241 stated that in instances where the 
common law remedies are inadequate to vindicate applicant‟s rights, it is imperative that new 
remedies are forged as per the mandate in section 38 of the Constitution. In the social grant 
cases, appropriate relief from the courts‟ point of view would be in the form of awarding 
damages to the applicants.242 The court further reiterated that: 
In the determination of appropriate relief, it is important to bear in mind that, 
although constitutional remedies will often be forward looking to ensure that the 
future exercise of public power is in accordance with the principal of legality . . . 
Moreover, in my respectful view, in order to vindicate the Constitution one should 
have regard to the basic values and principles enshrined therein. In this regard 
section 195(1) of the Constitution is of importance. It provides that public 
administration should be governed by the democratic values and principles 
enshrined in the Constitution, including the maintenance of the high standard of 
professional ethics, the provision of services impartially, fairly, equitably and 
without bias, and the necessity to respond to the needs of the people. Bearing in 
mind the observation of Kriegler J in Fose‟s case . . . that appropriate relief means 
that which is ‘specifically fitted or suitable’, it seems to me that it would be just 
and equitable for an aggrieved person in the position of the applicant to be placed 
in the same position which she would have been had her fundamental right to 
lawful and reasonable administrative action not been unreasonably delayed, and 
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that relief placing her in such a position would be appropriate as envisaged by the 
Constitution. 243  
In the environmental law context, the call for an appropriate remedy was considered in the 
case of Hichange.244 It is submitted that the court correctly held that such relief should not be 
limited to that which is provided for in legislation or the common law where sufficient 
grounds existed that would warrant relief outside of these boundaries.245 The common law as 
reflected was a rigid body of law only seeking to remedy the needs of the parties to the court 
action, whereas it should have also considered the public affected by such a case.246 Leach J 
stated that: 
the range of remedies from which such relief could be selected was not restricted 
to existing common-law remedies…I have no doubt that this court has a particular 
duty to ensure that, within the bounds of the Constitution, effective relief be 
granted for the infringement of any of the rights entrenched in it. In our context an 
appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective 
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights entrenched in the 
Constitution cannot properly be upheld or enhanced. Particularly in a country 
where so few have the means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is 
essential that on those occasions when the legal process does establish that an 
infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The 
courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to 'forge new 
tools' and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal. 247 
The rationale flowing from these cases is that the remedy courts should award in PIEL cases 
should have a similar impact as the relief sought in the first instance. Development of the law, 
or coming up with a new remedy, is not easy for the court to convey. The remedy that the 
courts have to formulate should not only be applicable to the litigants at hand, but should also 
have prospective application. In light of public interest litigants, the remedy should be one 
that can also be utilised by private parties, regardless of them being able to seek an interdict 
with ease.248 The remedy should be forward looking and proactive, and it should adequately 
vindicate the environmental right, which can be noted in the English law injunction remedy.  
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4.6 Injunction of English law 
Cowen stated that South African lawyers seeking to protect the environment should go 
beyond principles, and look to other developing countries on how they have made the 
transition to deal with different problems of a modern industrial society; an injunction is one 
such remedy.249 The courts can show doctrinal innovation in developing the law by 
assimilating the injunction remedy as a new remedy applicable in South African law. Prest 
defines an injunction as a „judicial process whereby a party is ordered to refrain from doing, 
or to do, a particular thing‟250 in the form of an interlocutory or perpetuity injunction. Similar 
to an interdict, an injunction has the capacity to accommodate both the interests of the private 
litigants, whilst at the same time accommodating public interest cases within the frame of the 
requirements.  
The injunction has been in existence for a long period of time in other legal systems, and has 
been developed along constitutional principles to which South Africa also subscribes. It has 
been suggested that the injunction utilised in the Canadian jurisprudence should be adopted, 
as this is where the constitutional court of South Africa constantly refers when interpreting 
constitutional rights.251 Assimilating an injunction radically transforms the manner in which 
the environmental right is protected, and at the same time gives effect to the broad locus 
standi provisions.   
The courts‟ adoption of the injunction remedy in South African law should be guided by the 
requirements framed in the Canadian case of Manitoba252 which were reiterated in the case of 
R.J.R Macdonald.253 The Canadian apex court stated that before an injunction could be 
awarded, a court had to be satisfied with regards to the three requirements.254 These three 
requirements are: Is there a serious issue to be tried? Will the applicant suffer irreparable 
harm if the injunction is not granted? And which party will suffer the greater harm from 
granting or refusing the remedy pending a decision on the merits?  
The first requirement that would need to be satisfied is whether the applicant has a serious 
issue to be tried. The interpretation of this requirement is made by looking at whether „the 
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claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be 
tried.‟255 The alleged infringement of a constitutional right is a serious allegation on the part 
of public interest litigants, which the courts cannot ignore. The court would be bound to 
consider the second and third requirements, unless the judge considers the case to be 
frivolous or vexatious. Broadening the frame of the cases that seek injunctions will in no way 
clog the courts‟ role, due to the huge litigation costs, but in essence will make sure that all 
rights are given equal weight by the courts, rather than procedural grounds hindering their 
determination. 
The second requirement that would be considered in an injunction application relates to the 
applicant showing the occurrence of irreparable harm if the relief is not to be granted. This 
requirement is the core to an injunction application, and at the same time to the protection of 
all rights. The nature of irreparable harm that an applicant would need to show relates only to 
the nature of harm as opposed to the magnitude of the harm.256 Monetary quantification or 
curability of the harm is not an important determining factor in the court‟s decision as to 
whether this requirement has been fulfilled, the only determining factor is the nature of the 
harm sought to be prevented.257 This is the core of a public interest litigant‟s basis in seeking 
such a relief, due to the nature of the harm that occurs to the environment.  
In most instances environmental harm is usually cumulative and restoration is almost 
impossible. As such, the environment cannot be seen as a mere commodity to which it can be 
replaced or quantified. The principles of liability in environmental law are only applicable to 
private parties rather than to the protection of the environment, hence the irreparability of the 
environment. In instances where public interest litigants seek a prohibitory injunction, 
showing the requirement of irreparable harm to the public would prove not to be difficult, 
since it is the very nature of the government department‟s mandate to undertake it. The 
requirement would be shown by an indication that the department under statute was given 
such a mandate to implement the legislation, and is failing to do so, thereby causing the 
environment harm.  
Lastly, the courts need to be convinced in relation to the third requirement that involves 
balancing the comparable inconvenience to the parties by weighing which of the two parties 
will suffer greater harm by not awarding the injunction. Cassels states that „the question 
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before the court is not which party stands to suffer the greater harm, but rather what interests 
deserve protection and how are those interests to be valued‟.258 Though the public interest is 
usually the guiding factor, public interest litigants will not always warrant such a favour in 
being awarded an injunction against the other party. The applicant seeking an injunction 
would need to base their arguments on how the public would benefit from the relief sought, 
as opposed to the harm the public would face when the same relief is not awarded.259  
4.7 Conclusion  
The courts have an important role to play in assisting public interest litigants in their efforts 
to protect the environment. The interdict is the only remedy currently available under 
common law that can effectively and immediately prevent irreparable harm from occurring to 
the environment. However, public interest litigants may face challenges in fulfilling these 
interdict requirements. In order to address these problems the courts may need a broader 
approach to the clear right requirement by allowing public interest litigants to establish a 
clear right based on their constitutional right to an environment that is not harmful to one‟s 
health or well-being. The adoption of this would be sufficient to address the main challenge 
public interest litigant‟s face in getting an interdict. The second challenge that public interest 
litigant‟s face is showing the occurrence of injury or resultant prejudice. This can be 
addressed through acknowledging that by allowing the illegal activity to persist, the 
constitutional right is violated and hence causing injury. By adopting these interpretations, 
private disputes that currently use the interdict remedy, can be broadened to include public 
interests, as intended for by the Constitution. 
 
The application for an interdict in a PIEL case protects the environment against further 
irreparable harm, and the denial of an interdict based on the traditional interdict requirements 
is unfortunate. It was noted above that the courts are not bound to grant appropriate relief 
from those remedies already provided for under existing common law and statutory remedies, 
but can forge new tools, such as an injunction, as this has been tried and tested in other legal 
systems to protect the environment. Rather than being one-sided, an injunction is a relief that 
can be applied by both public and private parties to address all their needs. The traditional 
manner in which the environment has been protected, on a private basis, has been found 
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wanting with the government being slow to fulfil its mandate in this regard. The courts in 
South Africa continue to play a crucial judicial activist role in socio-economic rights, and 



















CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 Introduction  
This study has discussed how the environmental right, despite being embedded in the 
Constitution and given effect in various statutes, has become the basis upon which PIEL 
needs effective remedies, such as the interdict, to support the aims of public interest litigants. 
In the course of the discussion, the challenges that public interest litigants continue to face 
within the present constitutional milieu were highlighted. These challenges are seen as 
seriously undermining the gains the Constitution has brought. The study also shows that the 
efforts of public interest litigants in giving effect to the environmental right, have to be 
supplemented by the judiciary through granting the interdict remedy. However, the core focus 
of this discussion has been the nature and importance of the interdict remedy in fulfilling the 
goals of public interest litigants, whilst discussing the various alternatives that courts can take 
when faced with an interdict application within the current requirements‟ framework. Public 
interest litigants play an important role in ensuring that an environment that is not harmful to 
people‟s health and well-being is secured, and this should be complemented by the remedies 
the courts award.  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
In the previous chapters, the important role that public interest litigants play in South Africa‟s 
environmental law jurisprudence, and the challenges faced in accessing the only available 
and effective relief has been highlighted. Statutes that are intended to provide remedies for 
the breach of environmental provisions have been mainly reactive in nature, and therefore 
unsuitable for meeting the needs of public interest litigants. Because the punishment given to 
violators is seen as a cost of doing business, the society that is meant to benefit from such 
remedies granted by the court, has seen no benefit as irreparable harm to the environment 
may have already occurred.   
In order to mitigate some of the issues discussed above, the following suggestions are put 
forward: 
a) The importance of environmental protection in society should be placed at the 
forefront by the courts in the same manner as the socio-economic rights have been 
protected through effective remedies. The remedy that the court grants in a public 




regulates the action of future conduct. Society is made more aware of the existence of 
the various environmental statutes, and the importance of court decisions in 
maintaining a healthy environment. This helps future violations to be quickly brought 
to light and preventative actions taken where possible.   
 
b) The government departments should work more closely with the various 
environmental public interest groups. NEMA envisages such cooperation between the 
State and the private sector in relation to the enforcement of the environmental 
statutes. It is through the cooperation between these two parties that government 
departments are made aware of statute violations, and at the same time implement 
punitive measures.  
 
c) The judiciary should be able to provide adequate remedies to address the needs of the 
litigants. It is suggested that the common law interdict requirements be adapted to be 
in line with the constitutional principles, or alternatively the courts adopt the English 
law injunction relief. It can be noted that the two reliefs all operate in the same 
manner and are broad enough to accommodate private litigants‟ injunction 
applications where a violation to other constitutional rights would have occurred. The 
denial of effective remedies on the basis of procedural impediments does not do any 
good for the development and protection of the environment.  
5.3 Conclusion  
More than fifteen years after the enactment of the much celebrated transformative 
Constitution of South Africa and the various environmental statutes, the approach used to 
enforce the nation‟s environmental laws is still a concern.260 With the state and the private 
litigants being more focused on attaining the needed socio-economic rights, violations to 
environmental laws have not had similar attention. Although public interest litigants have 
taken the mandate of enforcing the environmental right from the constitutional mandate, 
these efforts still face numerous challenges with regard to the remedies that are granted by 
the courts.   
With regard to developing the environmental jurisprudence in South Africa, the nature and 
importance of PIEL has been discussed. It was noted that protection of the environment 
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requires the courts to develop a new outlook when approaching environmental cases brought 
in the public interest, or in the interest of protecting the environment. Protection of the 
environment can now occur in the public interest under the Constitution, or in the interests of 
protecting the environment under NEMA. These extended locus standi provisions are a 
means by which the environmental right can be effectively addressed, contrary to the position 
that existed under the common law. The courts however continue to apply common law 
interdict requirements. Having been framed to deal with private rights, these requirements are 
being used in areas of public rights, thereby making it difficult for public litigation to fulfil 
the requirements of the interdict remedy.  
The interdict remedy as it stands can be regarded as an inadequate remedy where litigation 
occurs in the public interest, or in the interests of protecting the environment. Having noted 
the challenges of the interdict remedy in its present form, chapter four highlighted the 
possible solutions that the courts may implement when an interdict is sought in the 
environmental context. Two alternatives were presented to the courts in which the 
interpretation process adopted can be that used for other constitutional rights. This in essence 
would ensure that a party could be indicted for operating contrary to environmental 
provisions, or the state indicted for not enforcing the statutes.  In the event of these 
suggestions not finding favour in the eyes of the courts, the constitutional principles acting as 
the guiding factor would require appropriate relief to be granted, which may occur in the 
form of the English law injunction. 
The courts approach to the enforcement of the environmental right by public interest litigants 
should be addressed in the same manner as for private litigants. The Constitution has 
extended the locus standi provisions, and this should flow to the nature in which the 
environmental right is enforced; if not the supremacy of the Constitution is undermined. 
Appropriate recognition by the courts of the changed ideological climate should be made 
clear by granting proactive remedies when applied for in public interest cases.  The continued 
neglect of this ideological change makes the constitutional extended locus standi provision 
redundant as far as environmental protection is concerned, resulting in continued harm to the 
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